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Abstract
More than low default rates, lenders are interested in the expected return on their loans.
In this paper, we consider a number of other measures of repayment and nonpayment that
are likely to be of direct interest to lenders. Using data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond
Longitudinal Study, we document repayment and nonpayment outcomes 10 years after grad-
uation for American students receiving BA/BS degrees in 1993. We estimate differences in
these outcomes across individual/family background characteristics, college major, type of
institution, the amount borrowed, and post-graduation income. A key contribution is our
analysis of the following outcomes in addition to student loan default rates: the fraction
of the original undergraduate loan amount repaid as of 2003, nonpayment rates (including
deferment and forbearance as well as default), and the fraction of original undergraduate
loan amounts on which borrowers defaulted or are currently not repaying.
Keywords: Student Loans, Default, Forbearance and Deferment, Labor Market Out-
comes, Return to Lenders.
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1 Introduction
Increasing numbers of American students are borrowing thousands of dollars from public and
private lenders to finance their higher education, and growing numbers of them have been de-
faulting on their obligations. Over the past decade, the total number of Stafford Loan borrowers
has nearly doubled to 10.4 million recipients in 2011-12. In recent years, undergraduates have
borrowed more than $70 billion annually in federal student loans. More ominously, student loan
default rates have risen continuously since 2005 after falling for more than a decade. Three-year
cohort default rates stand at 13.4% for students entering repayment in 2009. Among students
from private for-profit institutions, three-year default rates exceed 20%.1 Against this backdrop,
there is growing concern that many students are borrowing too much, especially in the wake of
the Great Recession. These developments have led to renewed interest in the design of federal
student loan programs, including a re-evaluation of student borrowing limits, interest rates, and
income-contingent repayment schemes. Unfortunately, much of this discussion is occurring amidst
scant systematic evidence on the determinants of student loan repayment and default, especially
for recent cohorts.
Dynarski (1994), Flint (1997), and Volkwein et al. (1998) study the determinants of student
loan default using nationally representative data from the 1987 National Postsecondary Student
Aid Study that surveyed borrowers leaving school in the late 1970s and 1980s. Other empirical
studies have generally examined default behavior at specific institutions or in individual states in
the United States.2 Gross et al. (2009) provide a recent review of this literature and conclude that
factors such as race, socioeconomic background, educational attainment, type of postsecondary
institution, student debt levels, and post-school earnings are important determinants of default.
Minorities, students from low-income families, and college dropouts all tend to have higher default
rates, as do students attending two-year and for-profit private institutions. Default is also more
1See College Board (2012) for these and related statistics.
2See Schwartz and Finnie (2002) and Lochner et al. (2013) for empirical analyses of student loan repayment,
delinquency, and default in Canada.
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likely for those with high debt levels and low post-school earnings.
We go beyond previous analyses of default to consider other important measures of student
loan repayment and nonpayment that are likely to be of greater interest to potential lenders
(public or private). Most lenders are concerned about the expected return on their investments,
although government lenders may have other objectives. While default is a key factor affecting the
expected returns on student loans, other factors can also be important. For example, government
student loans offer opportunities for loan deferment or forbearance, which temporarily suspend
payments.3 The timing of default and deferment/forbearance can also influence returns to lenders.
From the lender’s point of view, it matters if a borrower defaults (without re-entering repayment)
immediately after leaving school or after five years of standard payments. The discounted value
of payments from the former is much lower than from the latter. Similarly, the discounted present
value of payments is much lower for borrowers who defer payments for extended periods of time
than for those who do not. These simple examples suggest that the creditworthiness of different
types of borrowers (based on their background or their schooling choices) depends on the expected
payment streams and not simply whether they had ever entered default or are currently in default
at some arbitrary survey date.
Unfortunately, an analysis of expected returns across different types of borrowers is impossible
given current data sources since it requires data on potential determinants of repayment and access
to full repayment histories. As far as we know, these data are not available. In this paper, we
use data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Studies (B&B) to analyze a number
of different repayment and nonpayment measures that provide useful information about expected
returns on student loans. As discussed further in Section 2, the B&B follows a random sample of
1992-93 American college graduates for 10 years and contains rich information about the individual
and family background of respondents, choice of college major and institution, student borrowing
3Expected returns on income-contingent lending programs, such as the new Pay As You Earn student loan
repayment program in the United States, can lead to full or partial loan forgiveness for borrowers experiencing
low income levels for extended periods. This clearly lowers the expected returns on the loans. Furthermore, the
timing of payments can affect expected returns if lenders have different discount rates from the nominal interest
rates charged on the loans.
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levels, post-school earnings, and loan repayment status (including outstanding balances) 5 and
10 years after graduation. We use the student loan records to compute five different measures
related to repayment and nonpayment of student loans 10 years after graduation: the fraction of
initial student debt still outstanding, an indicator for default status, an indicator for nonpayment
status (includes default, deferment and forbearance), the fraction of initial debt that is in default,
and the fraction of initial debt that is in nonpayment. We then study the determinants of all
of these repayment/nonpayment measures in Section 3, focusing on the roles of individual and
family background factors, college major, postsecondary institution characteristics, student debt
levels, and post-school earnings. We find that many of the factors identified in earlier studies
are important for our more recent sample of borrowers; however, the importance of some factors
depends on the measure of repayment or nonpayment under consideration.
We highlight a number of general lessons and open questions arising from our results and
conclude in Section 4.
2 Data: The Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study
We use the B&B to analyze patterns in student loan repayment and default for college graduates
up to 10 years after graduating. The B&B was initially drawn as a subsample from the 1993
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), a nationally representative random sample
of all postsecondary students in the United States.4 More specifically, the B&B has followed
the roughly 16,000 respondents who received baccalaureate degrees in the 1992-93 academic year
through 2003. The B&B uses data from three basic sources: survey data in 1993, 1994, 1997,
and 2003; institutional records on college costs and financial aid; and snapshots from student loan
administrative records in 1998 and 2003. With extensive information about family background
and demographic characteristics, student achievement as measured by SAT/ACT scores, college-
related outcomes (e.g., undergraduate major, institution attended, graduate school attendance,
4All averages in the following tables use the B&B panel weights to account for the sampling scheme of the
original NPSAS survey and attrition in subsequent surveys.
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and postgraduate degrees), labor market outcomes every few years, and student loan balances
and repayment status 5 and 10 years after graduation, the B&B offers a unique opportunity for
studying student loan repayment and default behavior in the United States.
The B&B sample is relatively homogeneous in its educational attainment: All students have at
least a BA/BS degree. The lack of college dropouts and students with less than four-year degrees
is unfortunate, since previous research shows that repayment problems are most common among
these individuals.5 Still, we find that many students who graduated from college in 1992-93 have
experienced repayment problems.
To focus on a typical American college student, we exclude noncitizens, the disabled, and
individuals receiving their BA/BS at age 30 or later (less than 14% received their BA/BS at later
ages). Because new graduates who then attend graduate school are eligible for automatic loan
deferments when they are enrolled, they will have spent less time in repayment. This directly
reduces their opportunities for both repayment and default within any given time frame, making
it difficult to compare their repayment/default outcomes with those of students who have not
participated in postgraduate studies. Our main analysis, therefore, excludes respondents who
attended 12 or more months of graduate school as of 1997, received any postgraduate degrees by
2003, or were enrolled in school in 2003.6 Altogether, this leaves 4,300 American citizens who
received baccalaureate degrees in 1992-93 but participated in little schooling thereafter. Roughly
half of these graduates report that they borrowed money for their undergraduate schooling as of
2003. Our analysis of repayment and default focuses on these 2,180 borrowers.
The B&B contains standard demographic characteristics such as gender and race/ethnicity
(Asian, black, Hispanic, white). We also use measures of maternal education, categorizing students
based on whether their mothers never attended college, attended but did not receive a BA/BS,
5See Gross et al. (2009) for a recent survey of the literature on student loan default.
6To understand the implications of these restrictions, we performed an analogous analysis without imposing the
restrictions on months of postgraduate study and degrees. In regressions using this broader sample (analogous to
those used in Tables 5 through 10), we also included indicator variables for the following graduate degrees: Master’s
level, professional degree, and doctoral degree. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the text,
with a few exceptions specifically noted below.
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or completed their BA/BS. Dependency status (for financial aid purposes) is also available for
students, along with parental income in 1991 for those who are dependents. The B&B also contains
data on student SAT and ACT scores. We categorize individuals into quartiles based on their SAT
score if it is available. If an individual did not report an SAT score, we use the corresponding
ACT quartile.7 The data also include information about the major course of undergraduate study
and the type of institution from which individuals graduated (public, private nonprofit, private
for-profit, historically black college/university). We use the undergradaute institution from which
individuals graduate to include a measure of the selectivity of the institution as determined by
Barron’s 1992 Admissions Competitiveness Index. We consider the following three competitiveness
categories: most competitive and highly competitive, very competitive and competitive, and all
others. Sample averages for all of these variables are reported for our sample of borrowers and
non-borrowers, as well as borrowers only, in Table A1.
Our main focus is on student borrowing, repayment, and default measured 10 years after
graduation. As noted earlier, roughly half of our sample borrowed funds for their undergraduate
studies. Among those who borrowed, the average amount of undergraduate loans was $9,300. On
average, another $600 was borrowed for graduate studies. The latter amount is small, since our
sample restrictions ensure that students in our sample spent very little (or no) time in graduate
school. Ten years after graduation, borrowers still owed, on average, $2,600 on their undergraduate
loans. Two-thirds had repaid their undergraduate loans in full.
Table 1 reports repayment status for borrowers as of 1998 and 2003. In both years, 92% were
repaying their loans or had already fully repaid their loans. The fraction of borrowers receiving a
deferment or forbearance declined from 3.8% in 1998 to 2.5% in 2003, while the share of borrowers
in default rose from 4.2% to 5.8% over this period.8 These figures suggest that deferment and
7These quartiles are based on the test score distributions for the full population rather than our restricted
sample.
8Our repayment measures are based on individual loan records from the National Student Loan Data System,
accessed in both 1998 and 2003. Loan status (for both dates) is determined from the most recent available status
date at the time records were accessed. Our measures of default include borrowers who had defaulted or had
expunged their student debt through bankruptcy. Since borrowers may have more than one loan in the system, we
cycle through all government student loans in a borrower’s records and set the default indicator to 1 if any of the
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forbearance are important forms of nonpayment with a diminishing role over time: They make
up nearly half of all nonpayments five years after school, falling to slightly less than one-third five
years later.
Table 2 shows transition rates for these repayment states from 1998 to 2003. The rows in the
table list the probabilities of being in repayment (including those who fully repaid), receiving a
deferment or forbearance, or being in default 10 years after school (in 2003) conditional on each of
those repayment states five years earlier in 1998. Ninety-four percent of borrowers in repayment
(including those who had fully repaid) in 1998 were also making their payments or had fully repaid
their loans by 2003. Four percent of borrowers who were in repayment (or fully repaid) in 1998
were in default five years later. Only 75% of borrowers in deferment/forbearance in 1998 were
in repayment (or fully repaid) five years later, while 16.5% were still in deferment/forbearance
and 8.5% were in default. Among those in default in 1998, 54% had returned to repayment
(or fully repaid) five years later, while 42% remained in default. Although there is considerable
persistence in these repayment states, many borrowers who were not making payments five years
after school (i.e., in deferment/forbearance or default) were making payments (or had fully repaid
their loans) five years later. Not surprisingly, deferment/forbearance is the least persistent state,
since it is designed to temporarily help borrowers in need. Indeed, borrowers cannot typically
receive a deferment or forbearance indefinitely. In the end, most borrowers who receive this form
of assistance return to repayment; however, one in six end up defaulting.
Finally, the B&B asked respondents about their earnings in the 1997 and 2003 surveys; we
also use these data. The 1997 survey asked respondents about their annual salary for the job they
were working during April of that year, while the 2003 survey asked respondents about their total
income from work earned in 2002. Based on these questions, respondents in our sample (borrowers
and nonborrowers alike) reported average earnings of roughly $30,000 in 1997 and $50,000 in 2002.
loans are determined to be in default (or expunged through bankruptcy). Similarly, if any loans are in deferment
or forbearance, we set the indicator for deferment/forbearance equal to 1.
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3 Determinants of Student Borrowing and Repayment
In this section, we study the determinants of undergraduate borrowing and repayment behavior
measured in 2003, roughly 10 years after graduation. Since the standard repayment plan for
Stafford loans is based on a 10-year repayment period, students who were always in good standing
and making the standard payment should have paid down most, if not all, of their loans. As we
show, many did not. In addition to studying the fraction of debt students repaid within the first
10 years after school, we also examine the traditional metric used to study student loan repayment
behavior: default.9 We then extend this metric to include borrowers in deferment or forbearance,
and report on the fraction of undergraduate debts remaining for borrowers that have defaulted or
are in nonpayment more generally.
We begin with an analysis of average post-school earnings, undergraduate borrowing and repay-
ment/nonpayment rates by student characteristics. We then explore differences in these outcomes
based on the type of institutions from which students graduated. Finally, we use standard mul-
tivariate regression methods to examine the importance of individual/family and institutional
factors, along with college major, student borrowing, and post-school earnings levels in deter-
mining student loan repayment, default, and other measures of nonpayment. This enables us to
identify which factors are most important while simultaneously controlling for other potentially
important factors.
3.1 Differences by Borrower Characteristics
Table 3 characterizes the post-school labor market outcomes, undergraduate borrowing, and re-
payment outcomes across different types of students defined by gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT
quartiles, and maternal education. Because we are primarily interested in repayment/nonpayment,
this table focuses on our sample of borrowers only. Before discussing repayment, we briefly com-
ment on differences in earnings and undergraduate borrowing across groups as reported in columns
9Default is defined as 270 days (9 months) of missed payments (excluding borrowers in formal programs designed
to reduce payment such as deferment or forbearance).
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(2) and (3).
Column (2) reveals a large difference in earnings (including incomes of zero for the non-
employed) between men and women, while differences by race/ethnicity, student aptitude, and
family background are more modest. Male college graduates earn about 70% more than female
graduates 10 years after finishing school. Blacks earn about 15% less than whites, while Asians
earn about 15% more. Hispanics had earnings similar to whites in our sample of borrowers. Earn-
ings increase over SAT/ACT quartiles 1 through 3; however, earnings for the top quartile are very
similar to those in the second quartile (nearly 20% less than the third quartile). This seemingly
perverse pattern at the top is largely due to our sample selection criteria, which exclude those
who attended 12 or more months of graduate school (by 1997) or received a graduate degree. This
restriction disproportionately affects the top aptitude quartile, and removing it yields very similar
average income levels for the top two quartiles (see Table A2). Differences in earnings based on
maternal education are relatively modest, although those with mothers who received a BA/BS
degree earned almost $9,000 more than those whose mothers did not attend college.
Column (3) in Table 3 reveals very small differences in average undergraduate loan amounts
compared across gender and SAT/ACT quartiles. Differences by race/ethnicity and maternal
background are more pronounced, though still modest. In considering race/ethnicity, Hispanics
borrowed the least at $8,100, while whites borrowed the most at about $1,300 more. Students
whose mothers finished college borrowed nearly $1,200 more than students whose mothers never
attended college. These two patterns suggest that whites and borrowers from higher socioeconomic
families are attending more expensive institutions, on average.
The remaining columns in Table 3 focus on repayment and nonpayment of student loans.
Column (4) reports the average fraction of undergraduate loan amounts still outstanding in 2003.
This provides a useful measure of returns to lenders within the first 10 years. As noted earlier,
borrowers who make standard payments every month should owe very little (or nothing) on their
undergraduate loans by this time. A high value here indicates low payment levels or periods of
nonpayment. As the first row in Table 3 shows, of the $9,300 initially borrowed, students still
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owed 19%, on average, 10 years later. Column (5) reports the fraction of borrowers in default,
while column (6) reports a broader measure of nonpayment that includes borrowers in deferment,
forbearance, or default. In our sample, 5.8% of all borrowers were in default 10 years after finishing
college, while 8.3% were not making payments for various reasons (i.e., deferment, forbearance,
or default). Finally, columns (7) and (8) report the average share of undergraduate loan amounts
currently in default or currently not being repaid because of deferment, forbearance, or default.10
If borrowers in default or nonpayment 10 years after leaving school are very unlikely to return to
good standing, these figures suggest that the expected loan loss rate (for a typical borrower) faced
by lenders is around 2.8% (based on defaults) or as high as 5.2% (based on any nonpayment).
These amounts are notably lower than default/nonpayment rates themselves (columns (5) and
(6)) because many defaulters (nonpayers) repay some of their student debts before entering default
(nonpayment).
Now, consider differences in repayment and nonpayment patterns by gender as reported in
Table 3. Consistent with significantly lower post-school earnings, women owe more on their loans
10 years after finishing college (22% vs. 15%) and have higher rates of nonpayment (9.5% vs. 6.7%)
compared with men. The fraction of debt in nonpayment was also 2.5 times higher for women than
for men. Yet, these differences are not apparent when comparing default rates, which are nearly
identical for men and women. Even with similar default rates, women have defaulted on 80%
more debt than have men. These figures highlight the value of considering alternative measures of
repayment and nonpayment beyond traditionally used default rates. Despite very similar default
rates between male and female student borrowers, lenders can expect faster payments and a higher
recovery rate from male students.
Differences in repayment behavior are much more pronounced by race/ethnicity than by gen-
der, with particularly stark differences between blacks and whites. On average, black borrowers
still owe 51% of their student loans 10 years after college, while white borrowers owe only 16%.
Hispanics and Asians owe 22% and 24%, respectively. Black borrowers have defaulted on 16% of
10Columns (7) and (8) report the sample averages for the shares of unpaid undergraduate loans multiplied by
the default and nonpayment indicators, respectively.
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their undergraduate debt and are in nonpayment on 21%. By contrast, the next highest rates of
nonpayment are for Hispanics, who have defaulted on only 3.1% of their debt and are in nonpay-
ment on 4.8%. Given these dramatic differences, it is interesting to note that default rates are
quite similar for all three minority groups (13% for blacks, 11% for Hispanics and Asians), while
they are much lower for whites (less than 5%). There are larger differences between blacks and
the other minority groups for nonpayment rates that include deferment and forbearance (18% for
blacks vs. 13% for Hispanics and Asians). Once again, important differences in repayment and
expected loan losses by lenders are obscured by focusing exclusively on default rates. It is also
worth noting that the racial/ethnic differences in repayment/nonpayment outcomes are unlikely
to be driven by differences in borrowing or post-school earnings, which are quite modest. We
explore this issue further below.
The share of undergraduate debt remaining 10 years after graduation is highest for students
with the lowest SAT/ACT scores (24% for the lowest quartile and 14% to 18% for all other quar-
tiles). All default and nonpayment outcomes show an interesting U-shaped pattern in achievement
that is roughly consistent with the inverted U-shaped pattern for earnings. Default and nonpay-
ment rates are as high as 6% and 10%, respectively, for the lowest SAT/ACT group; they then
fall to around 5% for the second and third quartiles before returning to higher levels for the top
ability group. A similar, though weaker, pattern is evident for the share of debt in default or
nonpayment. Unlike the relationship for earnings, the surprising nonmonotonic relationship be-
tween achievement and default/nonpayment is not a consequence of our sample restriction that
excludes those with graduate degrees or 12 or more months of graduate school. A similar pattern
arises even when we do not impose this restriction. Indeed, the fraction of debts in default or
nonpayment is actually highest for the top SAT/ACT quartile in the unrestricted sample (see
Table A2).
The last three rows in Table 3 show that socioeconomic status, as measured by maternal
education, is only weakly and statistically insignificantly related to default and nonpayment.11
11Throughout the paper, we refer to results as statistically significant based on a 0.05 significance level.
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By contrast, the fraction of debt repaid after 10 years is significantly higher for borrowers whose
mothers attended college. Students with stronger socioeconomic backgrounds appear to reduce
their loan balances more quickly; however, they do not appear to be any less likely to enter default,
deferment, or forbearance.
3.2 Differences by Institutional Characteristics
We next explore differences in borrowing and repayment/nonpayment patterns, categorizing indi-
viduals based on the type of institution from which they graduated. Table 4 shows differences by
institutional control (public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit) and by college selectivity
as determined by Barron’s. Given the high nonpayment rates for black college graduates reported
in Table 3, we also examine outcomes for blacks graduating from historically black colleges and
universities (HBCU) versus those from traditional non-HBCU institutions. Table 4, like Table 3,
is based on our sample of borrowers.
There is considerable interest today in the high default rates at private for-profit institutions.
There is also concern about the high debt levels associated with attendance at private institutions
more generally. The first few rows of Table 4 offer more detailed evidence on these issues from 1992-
93 graduates 10 years after school. Post-school earnings are quite similar across graduates from
public and private for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) institutions; however, student debt
levels are highest for graduates of NFP institutions ($11,200), followed by FP institutions ($9,700)
and public institutions ($8,400). Unfortunately, the sample size for FP institutions is quite small
(33), making it difficult to draw strong conclusions about borrowing and repayment/nonpayment
rates for this group; note the large standard errors across the table for this institution type.
On average, the fraction of debt still owed is slightly lower for public school graduates, but the
differences across institution types are statistically insignificant. Default and nonpayment rates are
very similar for public school graduates and NFP graduates, but they are 3 to 4 times higher (18%
and 26%, respectively) for FP graduates. Unfortunately, due to small sample sizes, we cannot
statistically distinguish across the groups. The extremely high default/nonpayment rates for FP
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graduates do not appear to translate into much higher shares of debt in default/nonpayment as
observed in the last two columns.
Our next set of results compares students based on Barron’s rankings of institutional selectiv-
ity. Earnings and debt levels are both notably higher among students from the most competitive
institutions. Differences in repayment, default, and nonpayment measures across school selectiv-
ity are quite modest and generally not statistically significant. As might be expected, default
and nonpayment rates are generally lowest for graduates of the most competitive institutions;
however, they do not have the lowest share of debt still owed. In general, these differences are
not statistically significant. There is little evidence to suggest that institutional selectivity is a
particularly important determinant of repayment and nonpayment; however, we examine below
whether important differences are confounded by other systematic differences in the characteristics
and choices of individuals attending these institutions.
Finally, the bottom of Table 4 compares the outcomes for blacks attending HBCU and non-
HBCU institutions. Small sample sizes are a problem here as with FP institutions, yet a few
patterns are worth noting. While earnings of HBCU graduates are similar to those of black
graduates from non-HBCUs, HBCU graduates leave school with significantly lower debt. The
most notable differences between HBCU and non-HBCU graduates, however, are for default and
nonpayment. Blacks from HBCUs have default (nonpayment) rates of 8% (12%) compared with
roughly twice those rates for non-HBCU graduates. Despite these sizable differences, the fraction
of debt in default or nonpayment is remarkably similar (16% and 2% to 21%, respectively).
3.3 A Multivariate Analysis of Student Loan Repayment
As Tables 3 and 4 show, many important dimensions of heterogeneity across college graduates
may affect repayment behavior. Therefore, it is important to simultaneously account for all of
these factors before drawing strong conclusions about which are most important and why. We
use standard multivariate regression methods to do this. These methods can be helpful in sorting
out questions such as the following: Are default rates so high among blacks because they attend
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different types of schools than whites...or because their SAT/ACT scores are lower...or because
their mothers are less educated? Do differences in repayment or nonpayment across institution
types simply reflect the students they attract?
Before exploring repayment and nonpayment outcomes, we begin by examining which fac-
tors determine how much a student borrows (based on our full sample of borrowers and non-
borrowers). Table 5 shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for total un-
dergraduate loan amounts (in $1,000s) as a function of (i) individual characteristics, (ii) col-
lege major, (iii) institutional characteristics, and (iv) state fixed effects based on the institutions
from which students graduated.12 Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics: gender,
race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quartile, maternal education, dependency status (for financial aid pur-
poses), and parental income (in $1,000s) interacted with dependency status.13 This specification is
useful for measuring the full impact of these individual/family characteristics on borrowing (and
repayment/nonpayment outcomes examined in subsequent tables) and incorporates any effects
coming through choice of major or institution of attendance. Column (2) controls for the same
background characteristics as well as college major (all other majors not specifically listed reflect
the omitted category), while column (3) includes controls for background characteristics and in-
stitution characteristics (e.g., type of control and Barron’s selectivity). Column (4) includes all
three types of variables: background, college major, and institutional characteristics. Comparing
estimated effects of background characteristics across columns (1) and (2) through (4) is informa-
tive about the extent to which individual characteristics affect borrowing through the choice of
college major or institution. Column (5) adds state fixed effects to the specification in column (4),
accounting for any unobserved differences in policies, educational institutions, and labor markets
that vary across states. Similar specifications are used to study repayment, default, and more
general measures of nonpayment below.
Several individual and family characteristics are important determinants of borrowing. Black
12Tobit estimates generally yield similar conclusions about which variables are important and their relative
magnitudes/signs.
13Unfortunately, parental income is unknown for students classified as independent.
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students borrow significantly more than all other racial/ethnic groups. Columns (1) and (2)
suggest that black graduates borrow nearly $2,000 more than whites. Accounting for choice of
major, this difference grows even larger suggesting that blacks tend to choose majors that are
not typically associated with extensive borrowing. We also estimate higher levels of borrowing
for students with better SAT/ACT scores. Comparing columns (1) and (4) suggests that much
of this difference is explained by choice of major and institution: Higher-scoring students tend
to attend schools and to choose majors associated with greater borrowing. Table 3 shows that
students whose mothers have college education tend to borrow more. Regression results in Table
5 show that the opposite is true once we account for other personal differences, especially race,
achievement, and parental income. Accounting for these other factors, students whose mothers
received their BA/BS borrow roughly $1,500 less than those whose mothers did not attend college.
The estimates also suggest that a $10,000 increase in parental earnings is associated with about
$250 less in borrowing. We find no evidence to suggest that differences in borrowing by maternal
education or parental income are due to differential choices regarding major and institution.
Some majors appear to be associated with greater borrowing — engineering, health-related
majors, history, and especially biology — though not necessarily with high-paying professions.
Institutional characteristics also appear to be important determinants of borrowing. Students
graduating from private (FP or NFP) institutions tend to borrow about $3,000 more than those
attending public institutions, all else equal. Black students attending HBCUs tend to borrow
$1,500 to $2,000 less than blacks attending other institutions. Less competitive institutions are
associated with about $600 to $700 less in borrowing, although these differences are not statistically
significant at the 0.05 level.
Altogether, many factors affect undergraduate borrowing; however, differences across individ-
uals, college majors, and institutions are generally modest. Tables 6 to 10 show the extent to
which these same factors affect repayment and nonpayment behavior for our sample of borrowers
only. All of these tables have the same structure, which is very similar to that of Table 5. Indeed,
the specifications in columns (1) to (4) are the same as in Table 5. These specifications are in-
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formative about the importance of characteristics and choices known ex ante (i.e., when lenders
decide how much to lend to students). It is also useful to consider the extent to which ex post
borrowing and earnings levels affect repayment/nonpayment outcomes conditional on these other
factors, as well as the extent to which background, college major, and institutional characteristics
affect repayment/nonpayment through borrowing and earnings levels. To explore these issues,
column (5) adds measures of earnings in 1997, earnings in 2002, and the total amount borrowed
for undergraduate schooling (all in $1,000s) to the background, college major, and institutional
characteristics of column (4). Column (6) also includes state fixed effects.
In Table 6, we consider the share of undergraduate debt still owed 10 years after graduation.
These OLS regressions produce a number of interesting results. First, column (1) shows that,
conditional on other background characteristics, the share of debt owed by men was almost 5
percentage points less than the share owed by women. About one-quarter of this difference is
explained by choice of college major (see column (2)) and another half by differences in post-school
earnings (see column (5) and recall that initial borrowing amounts were the same for men and
women as shown in Table 5). Most strikingly, the share of debt still owed was 22 to 27 percentage
points higher for blacks than for whites. While this gap is smaller than the unconditional gap in
Table 3, it is still statistically and economically quite significant. Comparing columns (1) through
(5) suggests that very little of this gap is explained by choice of major, institution, loan amounts,
or post-school earnings. Hispanics owe a slightly larger share of their debt than do whites; however,
half of the effect disappears when accounting for state fixed effects. Accounting for other individual
characteristics eliminates the raw differences by SAT/ACT scores in the fraction of debt still owed.
We also observe no differences by dependency status or parental income. Students whose mothers
graduated or obtained postgraduate degrees owe 4 to 7 percentage points less as a fraction of their
initial loan when compared with students whose mothers never attended college.
Engineering majors reduce their loans more within the first 10 years after graduating, owing 10
percentage points less as a share of their initial loan (compared with ‘other’ majors). Column (5)
in Table 6 suggests that this is not explained by differences in borrowing or post-school earnings.
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Accounting for earnings and borrowing levels (and state fixed effects), social science and humanities
majors appear to owe about 8 percentage points more (than ‘other’ majors) as a share of their
original loan amounts. Institutional characteristics do not play an important role in determining
repayment rates after accounting for loan amounts and post-school earnings.
As might be expected, both earnings and loan levels are important determinants of the share
of debt repaid. Students with higher earnings in 1997 had repaid a greater fraction of their debt
(roughly 1.2 percentage points for every $10,000 in earnings), while those with higher student
debt levels had repaid a lower fraction (roughly 1.3 percentage points for every additional $1,000
in debt). It is also worth noting that the R-squared values (reported at the bottom of the table)
suggest that debt levels and post-school earnings account for about 7% of the variation in the share
of debt owed, as much as individual background characteristics, college major, and institutional
characteristics combined (compare columns (4) and (5)).
We now turn to measures of nonpayment. Tables 7 and 8 show average marginal effects
from probit specifications for default and our broader measure of nonpayment that also includes
deferment/forbearance. There is considerable agreement for both of these outcomes, so we discuss
them together. Both blacks and Asians have significantly higher default and nonpayment rates
than whites (differences are about 6 to 9 percentage points), with slightly greater differences
observed for the broader measure of nonpayment.14 Default/nonpayment rates are quite similar for
whites and Hispanics. The estimated effects of race/ethnicity are similar across all specifications,
suggesting that racial and ethnic differences in default and nonpayment rates are not driven by
differences in choice of major or institution, student debt levels, or even post-school earnings
realizations. Parental income for dependent students reduces default and nonpayment, but the
effects are small in magnitude (e.g., an additional $10,000 in income lowers the probability of
default by less than 0.01) and drop by half when accounting for borrowing and post-school income
levels. Before accounting for loan amounts and post-school income (column (4)), we see that
business majors are significantly less likely to experience default/nonpayment, while history and
14When we do not exclude borrowers with longer periods of postgraduate studies or graduate degrees from our
sample, Asians have default/nonpayment rates similar to those of whites and Hispanics.
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math/science majors are more likely to experience these problems. Perhaps surprisingly, the
estimated effects of college major are not much different after accounting for student borrowing
and post-school earnings (compare columns (4) and (5)). None of the institutional characteristics
appear to influence default/nonpayment once individual background characteristics are accounted
for. Finally, we observe sizable and statistically significant effects of student borrowing levels and
post-school earnings. An extra $10,000 in earnings in 2002 is associated with a roughly 0.8 (1.2)
percentage-point drop in the probability of default (nonpayment), while an additional $1,000 in
student loans increases the likelihood of default (nonpayment) by 0.3 (0.4) percentage points.
Finally, we consider the extent to which these factors affect the share of undergraduate debt
on which borrowers have defaulted or are not currently paying (10 years after graduating). Tables
9 and 10 show results from OLS regressions for these two dependent variables. Here, we find that
compared with whites, blacks default on 11% to 13% more of their debt and are in nonpayment
on about 13% to 16% more of their debt. Despite similarly high default and nonpayment rates
for Asians and blacks (Tables 7 and 8), Asians neither default on nor are in nonpayment on a
larger fraction of their debts relative to whites and Hispanics. These findings suggest that blacks
enter nonpayment relatively early in the repayment process, while Asians enter relatively late
after much of their debt has been re-paid. The effects of race/ethnicity on the share of debts
in default/nonpayment are not driven by major, institution choices, differences in debt levels, or
post-school earnings. The final two rows of Table 10 suggest that after accounting for earnings and
borrowing differences, students from the top SAT/ACT quartile are in nonpayment on a greater
fraction of their undergraduate debt (about 4 percentage points more) than all other achieve-
ment groups. Other individual/family characteristics have little impact on the fraction of debt
in default/nonpayment. Choice of college major also appears to have only minor (and generally
statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level) effects on the share of debt in default/nonpayment;
however, the estimates in the final two columns suggest that health majors default on a signif-
icantly smaller fraction, while humanities majors are in nonpayment on a significantly higher
fraction. Institutional control and college selectivity are unrelated to the share of debts in de-
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fault/nonpayment; however, black borrowers attending HBCUs appear to stop paying and default
on a significantly lower fraction of their debt than otherwise similar black borrowers who attend
non-HBCUs. As with the probability of default and nonpayment, higher earnings reduce the share
of debt on which individuals default or stop paying, while higher debt levels increase the share.
Contrary to the case with default and nonpayment, earnings in 1997 (a few years after gradua-
tion) rather than in 2003 are most important here. This finding is not surprising, because most
individuals enter default/nonpayment in the first few years after graduation. An extra $10,000 in
1997 earnings reduces the fraction of debt in nonpayment by about 0.4 percentage points, while an
additional $1,000 in undergraduate debt reduces this fraction by just over 0.3 percentage points.
3.4 Summary of Findings
Given the large number of specifications we consider for each outcome, it is useful to briefly
summarize our findings. Table 11 shows the estimates for all five repayment/nonpayment outcomes
based on our most general specification (column (6) of Tables 6 through 10). To further focus on
the factors that matter, only variables that are statistically significant for at least one outcome
are included.
Among the individual and family background characteristics, only race is consistently impor-
tant for all measures of repayment/nonpayment. Ten years after graduation, black borrowers owe
22% more on their loans, are 6 (9) percentage points more likely to be in default (nonpayment),
have defaulted on 11% more loans, and are in nonpayment on roughly 16% more of their under-
graduate debt compared with white borrowers. These striking differences are largely unaffected
by controls for choice of college major, institution, or even student debt levels and post-school
earnings. By contrast, the repayment and nonpayment patterns of Hispanics are very similar to
those of whites. Asians show high default/nonpayment rates (similar to blacks) but their shares
of debt still owed or debt in default/nonpayment are not significantly different from those of
whites. This suggests that many Asians who enter default/nonpayment do so after repaying much
of their student loan debt. Maternal college attendance is associated with a greater share of debt
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repaid after 10 years, while dependency status and parental income are largely unimportant for
repayment/nonpayment after controlling for other factors.
The B&B data suggest some variation in repayment/nonpayment across college major choices;
however, which majors are most “successful” in terms of repayment of debt depends on the mea-
sure. Engineering majors owe a significantly smaller share of their debts (than ‘other’ majors)
after 10 years, while social science and humanities majors owe a larger share. Humanities majors
are also in nonpayment on the greatest share of debt. Default rates are lowest for business majors,
whereas health majors default on the lowest fraction of their debts (these are the only significantly
different coefficients). In most cases, differences in these repayment measures across majors are
modest compared with differences between blacks and whites.
Differences in repayment/nonpayment across the type of institutional control or selectivity
are always small and generally statistically insignificant for our sample of 1992-93 graduates.
Among black borrowers, those attending HBCUs tend to be in nonpayment on significantly less
debt (roughly 12% less); however, other repayment/nonpayment measures show no statistically
significant effects of an HBCU. Unfortunately, low sample sizes and correspondingly high standard
errors limit the conclusions we can draw from our analysis of HBCUs.
Student debt and post-school income levels are both statistically significant determinants of
all measures of repayment and nonpayment, although the estimated effects are modest (e.g., an
extra $10,000 in 2002 earnings reduces the probability of nonpayment by 1.2 percentage points and
$1,000 in additional student debt raises the probability of nonpayment by 0.4 percentage points).
For measures related to the fraction of student debt outstanding, earnings a few years after school
are more important than earnings 10 years later when we measure repayment/nonpayment. The
opposite is true when considering simple default/nonpayment rates.
4 Some General Lessons and Conclusions
To the extent that government and private lenders care about expected returns on student loans
they distribute, we show that analyses of default rates at some arbitrary date offer an incomplete
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picture for several reasons. First, many borrowers who enter default eventually return to good
standing. Second, borrowers enter default at different times. Total discounted payments are
much lower from borrowers who default (without re-entering repayment) early relative to late in
their repayment period. Third, other forms of nonpayment are also important, especially during
early years. For example, deferment and forbearance are more common than default 5 years after
entering repayment. Even if borrowers eventually repay their loans, pushing payments years into
the future can be costly to lenders, especially if interest is forgiven.
Differences between default rates and other measures of nonpayment can be sizable. For
example, our results suggest that modest black-white differences in default understate much larger
differences in expected losses when measured by the fraction of initial debt still owed or in default
after 10 years. The opposite is true comparing Asians and whites. Default and nonpayment rates
are high for Asians 10 years into repayment, but the fraction of debt repaid within 10 years and
the fraction in default are not statistically higher than corresponding rates for whites. Although
blacks and Asians default at similar rates, blacks stop paying their loans early while Asians enter
default relatively late.
Not surprisingly, borrowers are less likely to experience repayment problems when they have
low debt levels or high post-school earnings. These effects are robust and important. As a ballpark
figure for all repayment/nonpayment measures, an additional $1,000 in debt can be roughly offset
by an additional $10,000 in income. For example, an additional $1,000 in student debt increases
the share of debt in nonpayment by 0.3 percentage points, while an extra $10,000 in earnings nine
years after graduation reduces this share by 0.4 percentage points.
Given the importance of post-school earnings for repayment, it is natural to expect that dif-
ferences in average earnings levels across demographic groups or college majors would translate
into corresponding differences in repayment/nonpayment rates — but this is not always the case.
Despite substantial differences in post-school earnings by race, gender, and academic aptitude,
differences in student loan repayment/nonpayment across these demographic characteristics are,
at best, modest for all except race. And, while blacks have significantly higher nonpayment rates
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than whites, the gaps are not explained by differences in post-school earnings — nor are they
explained by choice of major, type of institution, or student debt levels. Differences in post-school
earnings (and debt) also explain less than half of the variation in repayment/nonpayment across
college majors. We estimate little difference in repayment/nonpayment across different types of
institutions attended by students.
Our findings raise a number of important questions. First, what explains the poor repayment
performance for black borrowers conditional on their post-school income, debt, and other de-
mographic characteristics? Recent research by Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu (2013)
suggests that parental transfers are an important determinant of student loan repayment for Cana-
dian borrowers with low post-school earnings. Given relatively low wealth levels among American
blacks (Shapiro and Oliver, 1997; Barsky et al., 2002) it is likely that differences in parental sup-
port at least partially explain their high nonpayment rates. This issue certainly merits greater
attention.
Second, what explains the large differences in national cohort rates by institution type (e.g.,
two- vs. four-year or public vs. private schools)? Official two-year cohort default rates for the 2010
cohort are more than twice as high at four-year for-profit schools as they are at four-year public
or private not-for-profit schools (13.6% vs. 6.0% and 5.1%, respectively). Yet, our results based
on individual-level data suggest little difference in repayment patterns across institution types
for college graduates. The discrepancy between our findings and official default rates can almost
certainly be traced to much higher dropout rates at for-profit schools than at public or private
not-for-profit schools (Deming, Goldin and Katz, 2012) and much higher default rates for dropouts
(Gross et al., 2009). In this case, the default problem at private for-profit schools may simply be
a symptom of an underlying dropout problem. More generally, it is important to remember that
(i) our repayment/nonpayment patterns are based on a sample of baccalaureate degree recipients
and (ii) some of these relationships might differ for borrowers without a four-year degree.
Third, with so many important changes in the labor market and higher education sector over
the past few decades, how different would things look for today’s graduates? Recent evidence by
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Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu (2013) suggests that the role of post-school income may
have become more important for recent students, consistent with increased government attention to
repayment enforcement. The increasing importance of college major as a determinant of earnings
(Gemici and Wiswall, 2011) suggests that greater differences in repayment across majors for more
recent cohorts might also be expected, but this is far from certain given the modest role of earnings
differences in explaining variation in repayment/nonpayment by college major in our sample. It
is even more difficult to predict how other results might change. Data on more recent cohorts are
obviously needed to better inform current policy debates.
We conclude by arguing that future research and policy discussions of student loan repayment
need to move beyond an exclusive focus on default rates. Other forms of nonpayment are common,
and the actual timing of default matters as much as whether default occurs.
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Table 1: Repayment Status for Undergraduate Borrowers Five and Ten Years after Graduation
Status 1998 2003
Fully repaid 0.269 0.639
(0.013) (0.013)
Repaying or fully paid 0.920 0.917
(0.008) (0.007)
Deferment or forbearance 0.038 0.025
(0.006) (0.004)
Default 0.042 0.058
(0.006) (0.005)
The table shows means (standard errors) for
repayment status indicators based on the B&B
sample of borrowers.
Table 2: Repayment Status Transition Probabilities
Repayment Status in 2003
Repayment Status in 1998 Repaying/Fully Paid Deferment/Forbearance Default
Repaying or fully paid 0.939 0.020 0.040
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Deferment or forbearance 0.749 0.165 0.085
(0.063) (0.057) (0.032)
Default 0.544 0.038 0.418
(0.070) (0.020) (0.068)
The table shows the probability of each status in 2003 conditional on the status in 1998. Estimates
based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
Table 3: Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003
by Individual Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total UG Share of Fraction Fraction Default × Not Paying ×
Earnings Loan Amt. UG Debt in Not Share of Debt Share of Debt
Characteristic N (in $1,000) (in $1,000) Still Owed Default Paying Still Owed Still Owed
Full sample 2,120 49.629 9.336 0.188 0.058 0.083 0.028 0.052
(1.300) (0.179) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Males 900 64.199 9.646 0.146 0.057 0.067 0.019 0.028
(2.426) (0.304) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Females 1,210 37.705 9.091 0.221 0.059 0.095 0.034 0.071
(1.097) (0.212) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Asians 50 58.085 8.706 0.236 0.112 0.130 0.020 0.026
(3.975) (1.039) (0.075) (0.043) (0.047) (0.013) (0.015)
Blacks 150 42.123 9.165 0.506 0.132 0.180 0.156 0.208
(2.513) (0.522) (0.064) (0.029) (0.032) (0.057) (0.060)
Hispanics 130 47.235 8.127 0.216 0.113 0.134 0.031 0.048
(3.115) (0.786) (0.054) (0.038) (0.041) (0.011) (0.020)
Whites 1,780 49.965 9.441 0.158 0.047 0.070 0.017 0.040
(1.483) (0.197) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q1 510 41.641 9.466 0.236 0.061 0.097 0.032 0.059
(1.641) (0.460) (0.025) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011)
SAT/ACT Q2 500 50.197 9.153 0.141 0.048 0.054 0.022 0.025
(2.164) (0.319) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q3 480 60.087 9.673 0.175 0.047 0.076 0.010 0.026
(3.914) (0.371) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q4 370 50.540 9.131 0.151 0.061 0.084 0.027 0.052
(2.508) (0.378) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
Mother no college 920 48.168 8.911 0.223 0.060 0.088 0.027 0.058
(1.726) (0.240) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012)
Mother some college 610 44.452 9.184 0.140 0.055 0.069 0.028 0.039
(1.960) (0.297) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Mother BA+ 580 56.838 10.161 0.180 0.058 0.089 0.028 0.055
(3.177) (0.416) (0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
The table shows sample means (standard errors) based on the B&B sample of borrowers.
Table 4: Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003
by Type of Institution Attended
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total UG Share of Fraction Fraction Default × Not Paying ×
Earnings Loan Amt. UG Debt in Not Share of Debt Share of Debt
Institution Type N (in $1,000) (in $1,000) Still Owed Default Paying Still Owed Still Owed
Public 1,350 49.458 8.407 0.174 0.056 0.076 0.025 0.047
(1.630) (0.224) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Private NFP 720 49.827 11.207 0.213 0.054 0.086 0.032 0.061
(2.268) (0.297) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Private FP 30 51.434 9.738 0.199 0.182 0.264 0.059 0.087
(7.896) (1.263) (0.073) (0.091) (0.108) (0.042) (0.047)
Most competitive 150 61.583 11.453 0.202 0.043 0.087 0.009 0.043
(4.663) (0.650) (0.034) (0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.014)
Competitive 1,300 49.990 9.471 0.168 0.054 0.075 0.026 0.041
(1.558) (0.235) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Noncompetitive 620 46.041 8.668 0.230 0.065 0.096 0.034 0.076
(2.696) (0.308) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021)
Black, not HBCU 100 44.421 10.085 0.448 0.170 0.223 0.157 0.203
(3.088) (0.667) (0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048)
Black, HBCU 50 38.850 7.855 0.589 0.078 0.119 0.155 0.215
(4.075) (0.837) (0.132) (0.033) (0.041) (0.124) (0.129)
The table shows sample means (standard errors) based on the B&B sample of borrowers.
Table 5: Explaining Total Undergraduate Student Loan Amounts
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.086 0.046 0.192 0.139 0.096
(0.211) (0.222) (0.208) (0.218) (0.215)
Black 1.875* 1.843* 2.559* 2.460* 2.803*
(0.486) (0.486) (0.559) (0.557) (0.549)
Hispanic 0.670 0.744 0.695 0.733 1.561*
(0.523) (0.521) (0.520) (0.518) (0.551)
Asian -0.626 -0.767 -0.499 -0.673 -0.079
(0.609) (0.609) (0.600) (0.600) (0.616)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.254 0.110 0.215 0.089 0.139
(0.282) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) (0.273)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.723* 0.545 0.588* 0.413 0.348
(0.293) (0.296) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290)
SAT/ACT Q4 1.076* 0.749* 0.639* 0.312 0.195
(0.318) (0.325) (0.322) (0.328) (0.324)
Mother some college -0.641* -0.608* -0.625* -0.580* -0.310
(0.263) (0.262) (0.259) (0.257) (0.254)
Mother BA+ -1.447* -1.402* -1.607* -1.525* -1.445*
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244) (0.243) (0.240)
Dependent -0.131 -0.041 -0.376 -0.291 -0.643*
(0.270) (0.269) (0.266) (0.265) (0.265)
Parental income -0.025* -0.025* -0.026* -0.026* -0.023*
× dependent (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business 0.004 -0.075 -0.184
(0.374) (0.368) (0.360)
Education 0.436 0.306 0.215
(0.375) (0.368) (0.363)
Engineering 1.263* 1.445* 1.228*
(0.467) (0.460) (0.453)
Health 1.904* 1.953* 1.755*
(0.459) (0.451) (0.447)
Public affairs -0.402 -0.588 -0.893
(0.603) (0.592) (0.584)
Biology 3.189* 2.897* 2.951*
(0.532) (0.527) (0.523)
Math science 0.318 0.321 0.447
(0.488) (0.482) (0.476)
Social science 0.453 0.340 0.112
(0.407) (0.400) (0.395)
History 1.618* 1.008 1.195
(0.797) (0.779) (0.767)
Humanities 0.440 0.013 -0.031
(0.408) (0.403) (0.396)
Psychology -0.072 0.122 0.330
(0.609) (0.596) (0.588)
Private FP 2.798* 3.049* 3.036*
(1.045) (1.039) (1.023)
Private NFP 3.075* 3.089* 2.656*
(0.226) (0.225) (0.235)
HBCU -2.128* -1.945* -1.552
(0.909) (0.907) (0.906)
Competitive -0.657 -0.565 -0.675
(0.385) (0.384) (0.397)
Noncompetitive -0.651 -0.567 -0.720
(0.427) (0.426) (0.440)
State fixed effects No No No No Yes
N 3750 3750 3700 3690 3690
R2 0.062 0.077 0.113 0.128 0.183
Estimates (standard errors) based on the sample of B&B borrowers and
nonborrowers. * p < 0.05.
Table 6: Explaining Fraction of Undergraduate Student Debt Still Owed Ten Years After Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male -0.0467* -0.0341 -0.0471* -0.0344 -0.0170 -0.0194
(0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0189) (0.0190)
Black 0.2710* 0.2720* 0.2560* 0.2510* 0.2440* 0.2160*
(0.0329) (0.0332) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0396)
Hispanic 0.0610 0.0602 0.0681 0.0669 0.0675 0.0347
(0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0411)
Asian 0.0697 0.0621 0.0659 0.0598 0.0616 0.1070
(0.0547) (0.0546) (0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0594) (0.0615)
SAT/ACT Q2 -0.0000 0.0013 0.0017 0.0032 0.0088 0.0056
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0236)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0046 0.0112 0.0056 0.0129 0.0179 0.0235
(0.0233) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0249) (0.0252)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0143 0.0187 0.0093 0.0146 0.0228 0.0289
(0.0252) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0266) (0.0272) (0.0276)
Mother some college -0.0556* -0.0573* -0.0557* -0.0573* -0.0449* -0.0467*
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0205)
Mother BA+ -0.0596* -0.0659* -0.0655* -0.0724* -0.0550* -0.0616*
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0213)
Dependent -0.0073 -0.0079 -0.0129 -0.0132 -0.0190 -0.0094
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0237)
Parental income 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004
× dependent (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Business -0.0475 -0.0488 -0.0199 -0.0200
(0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0321) (0.0320)
Education -0.0333 -0.0356 -0.0437 -0.0411
(0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0317) (0.0320)
Engineering -0.1040* -0.1090* -0.0856* -0.0896*
(0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0375) (0.0378)
Health -0.0127 -0.0167 -0.0040 -0.0073
(0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0376) (0.0380)
Public affairs -0.0368 -0.0404 -0.0165 0.0022
(0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0507) (0.0509)
Biology 0.0052 0.0036 -0.0225 -0.0502
(0.0402) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0420)
Math science -0.0259 -0.0254 -0.0189 -0.0589
(0.0380) (0.0387) (0.0403) (0.0409)
Social science 0.0390 0.0397 0.0577 0.0783*
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0351)
History 0.0216 0.0119 0.0186 0.0236
(0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0604) (0.0610)
Humanities 0.0559 0.0600 0.0742* 0.0826*
(0.0336) (0.0342) (0.0352) (0.0353)
Psychology 0.0482 0.0494 0.0666 0.0610
(0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0512) (0.0514)
Private FP -0.0411 -0.0491 -0.0832 -0.0656
(0.0781) (0.0780) (0.0888) (0.0890)
Private NFP 0.0520* 0.0474* -0.0000 0.0044
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0197)
HBCU 0.0416 0.0611 0.0488 0.0409
(0.0649) (0.0653) (0.0665) (0.0686)
Competitive -0.0115 -0.0090 0.0111 -0.0126
(0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0344)
Noncompetitive -0.0046 -0.0003 0.0203 -0.0118
(0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0378)
1997 earnings -0.0012* -0.0011*
($1,000s) (0.0005) (0.0005)
2002 earnings -0.0004 -0.0004
($1,000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
UG loan amount 0.0130* 0.0133*
($1,000s) (0.0012) (0.0012)
State fixed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1850 1850 1820 1820 1610 1610
R2 0.0507 0.0653 0.0562 0.0717 0.1410 0.1910
The table shows coefficient estimates (standard errors) based on OLS regressions for the
fraction of student loan debt still owed in 2003. * p < 0.05.
Table 7: Explaining Default Ten Years After Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male -0.0023 -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0089 -0.0001 0.0005
(0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Black 0.0733* 0.0687* 0.0804* 0.0732* 0.0665* 0.0554*
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Hispanic 0.0194 0.0184 0.0216 0.0191 0.0317 0.0267
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0233)
Asian 0.0709* 0.0704* 0.0750* 0.0745* 0.0734* 0.0718*
(0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0326)
SAT/ACT Q2 -0.0040 -0.0125 -0.0071 -0.0163 -0.0071 -0.0087
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0165)
SAT/ACT Q3 -0.0079 -0.0146 -0.0074 -0.0133 -0.0175 -0.0150
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0179)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0185 0.0052 0.0206 0.0073 0.0056 0.0061
(0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Mother some college 0.0104 0.0119 0.0126 0.0143 0.0177 0.0225
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Mother BA+ 0.0182 0.0149 0.0180 0.0139 0.0064 0.0029
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Dependent -0.0040 -0.0132 -0.0012 -0.0122 -0.0152 -0.0170
(0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0191)
Parental income -0.0010* -0.0008* -0.0010* -0.0008* -0.0005 -0.0004
× dependent (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Business -0.0765* -0.0748* -0.0831* -0.0810*
(0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0310) (0.0310)
Education -0.0239 -0.0240 -0.0321 -0.0256
(0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0212)
Engineering -0.0224 -0.0369 -0.0226 -0.0177
(0.0257) (0.0275) (0.0291) (0.0289)
Health -0.0183 -0.0254 -0.0376 -0.0475
(0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0268)
Public affairs -0.0127 -0.0137 -0.0168 -0.0171
(0.0339) (0.0336) (0.0328) (0.0328)
Biology 0.0125 0.0140 0.0062 0.0089
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0245)
Math science 0.0451* 0.0478* 0.0380 0.0329
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0241)
Social science -0.0310 -0.0288 -0.0321 -0.0221
(0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0241)
History 0.0681* 0.0678* 0.0491 0.0501
(0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0329)
Humanities -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0031 0.0008
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0226)
Psychology 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0673 -0.0657
(0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0430) (0.0435)
Private FP -0.0110 -0.0156
(0.0590) (0.0607)
Private NFP 0.0085 0.0069 -0.0088 -0.0056
(0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0133)
HBCU -0.0331 -0.0281 -0.0099 -0.0049
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0376)
Competitive 0.0158 0.0145 0.0138 0.0117
(0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0249)
Noncompetitive 0.0167 0.0164 0.0274 0.0181
(0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0269)
1997 earnings -0.0003 -0.0001
($1,000s) (0.0004) (0.0004)
2002 earnings -0.0008* -0.0008*
($1,000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
UG loan amount 0.0027* 0.0028*
($1,000s) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Division fixed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1870 1870 1840 1840 1610 1610
Log likelihood -436.7 -421.4 -426.4 -410.0 -337.9 -328.0
The table shows average marginal effects (standard errors) based on probit specifications for
default in 2003. * p < 0.05.
Table 8: Explaining Nonpayment (Default, Deferment, or Forbearance) Ten Years After Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male -0.0170 -0.0197 -0.0212 -0.0235 -0.0049 -0.0027
(0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Black 0.0900* 0.0855* 0.0999* 0.0906* 0.0905* 0.0853*
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0247)
Hispanic 0.0070 0.0045 0.0108 0.0070 0.0269 0.0286
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0266) (0.0269)
Asian 0.0790* 0.0768* 0.0826* 0.0810* 0.0885* 0.0888*
(0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0377)
SAT/ACT Q2 -0.0178 -0.0249 -0.0210 -0.0287 -0.0257 -0.0265
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0187)
SAT/ACT Q3 -0.0150 -0.0189 -0.0157 -0.0188 -0.0191 -0.0182
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0268 0.0114 0.0257 0.0106 0.0081 0.0062
(0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0202)
Mother some college -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0008 0.0076
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Mother BA+ 0.0014 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0069 -0.0055 -0.0068
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0168)
Dependent 0.0324 0.0256 0.0340 0.0251 0.0126 0.0112
(0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Parental income -0.0014* -0.0013* -0.0015* -0.0013* -0.0008 -0.0007
× dependent (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Business -0.0709* -0.0702* -0.0522 -0.0507
(0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0294)
Education -0.0411 -0.0415 -0.0478 -0.0421
(0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0252)
Engineering -0.0315 -0.0480 -0.0262 -0.0211
(0.0310) (0.0329) (0.0349) (0.0348)
Health -0.0040 -0.0113 -0.0120 -0.0195
(0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Public affairs -0.0159 -0.0167 -0.0019 -0.0050
(0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0367) (0.0367)
Biology 0.0073 0.0060 -0.0004 -0.0014
(0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0292) (0.0293)
Math science 0.0555* 0.0587* 0.0538 0.0480
(0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0283)
Social science -0.0302 -0.0282 -0.0252 -0.0136
(0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0273)
History 0.0868* 0.0847* 0.0653 0.0658
(0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0382) (0.0383)
Humanities 0.0141 0.0139 0.0184 0.0231
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0252)
Psychology 0.0416 0.0404 0.0097 0.0120
(0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0363) (0.0365)
Private FP 0.0116 0.0154
(0.0620) (0.0611)
Private NFP 0.0201 0.0167 -0.0036 -0.0000
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0146)
HBCU -0.0465 -0.0322 -0.0438 -0.0399
(0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0434) (0.0443)
Competitive -0.0100 -0.0129 0.0033 -0.0020
(0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Noncompetitive -0.0071 -0.0094 0.0171 0.0043
(0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0289)
1997 earnings -0.0005 -0.0003
($1,000s) (0.0005) (0.0005)
2002 earnings -0.0012* -0.0012*
($1,000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
UG loan amount 0.0040* 0.0040*
($1,000s) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Division fixed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1870 1870 1840 1840 1610 1610
Log likelihood -555.1 -538.4 -543.4 -525.9 -404.7 -396.1
The table shows average marginal effects (standard errors) based on probit specifications
for nonpayment in 2003. * p < 0.05.
Table 9: Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Default Ten Years After Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.0117 -0.0124 -0.0060 -0.0058
(0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0010) (0.0102)
Black 0.1060* 0.1050* 0.1300* 0.1290* 0.1160* 0.1080*
(0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0212)
Hispanic 0.0248 0.0249 0.0262 0.0257 0.0297 0.0164
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0219)
Asian 0.0069 0.0028 0.0077 0.0039 0.0042 0.0031
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0315) (0.0330)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.0069 0.0052 0.0038 0.0018 0.0060 0.0086
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0126)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0026 0.0008 0.0025 0.0004 0.0033 0.0062
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0135)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0213 0.0163 0.0215 0.0157 0.0192 0.0216
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0147)
Mother some college -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0024 0.0011 0.0009
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0110)
Mother BA+ -0.0156 -0.0186 -0.0143 -0.0176 -0.0152 -0.0185
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0114)
Dependent -0.0081 -0.0130 -0.0064 -0.0116 -0.0111 -0.0118
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0127)
Parental income -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
× dependent (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Business -0.0333* -0.0315* -0.0266 -0.0235
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0169) (0.0171)
Education -0.0229 -0.0213 -0.0317 -0.0323
(0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0171)
Engineering -0.0328 -0.0297 -0.0210 -0.0159
(0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0198) (0.0202)
Health -0.0291 -0.0337 -0.0394* -0.0424*
(0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0203)
Public affairs -0.0115 -0.00849 -0.00620 -0.00579
(0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0273)
Biology -0.0155 -0.0147 -0.0214 -0.0199
(0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0224)
Math science 0.0226 0.0283 0.0404 0.0375
(0.0189) (0.0193) (0.0213) (0.0219)
Social science -0.0162 -0.0128 -0.0133 -0.0081
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0187)
History 0.0208 0.0235 0.0179 0.0103
(0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0312) (0.0320)
Humanities 0.0269 0.0301 0.0277 0.0305
(0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0188)
Psychology -0.0212 -0.0232 -0.0367 -0.0397
(0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0271) (0.0276)
Private FP -0.0208 -0.0272 -0.0420 -0.0310
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0456) (0.0463)
Private NFP -0.0038 -0.0057 -0.0200* -0.0117
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0105)
HBCU -0.0805* -0.0803* -0.0644 -0.0604
(0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0366)
Competitive 0.0187 0.0197 0.0214 0.0120
(0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0185)
Noncompetitive 0.0079 0.0098 0.0130 -0.0050
(0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0190) (0.0203)
1997 earnings -0.0006* -0.0005
($1,000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
2002 earnings -0.0001 -0.0001
($1,000s) (0.0001) (0.0001)
UG loan amount 0.0026* 0.0029*
($1,000s) (0.0006) (0.0007)
State fixed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1870 1870 1840 1840 1630 1630
R2 0.0302 0.0434 0.0341 0.0483 0.0634 0.0911
The table shows coefficient estimates (standard errors) based on OLS regressions for the
fraction of student loan debt in default in 2003. * p < 0.05.
Table 10: Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Nonpayment Ten Years After Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male -0.0191 -0.0163 -0.0196 -0.0180 -0.0148 -0.0140
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0137) (0.0139)
Black 0.1340* 0.1350* 0.1590* 0.1560* 0.1590* 0.1580*
(0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0282) (0.0290)
Hispanic 0.0091 0.0111 0.0109 0.0121 0.0244 0.0214
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0265) (0.0300)
Asian -0.0033 -0.0100 -0.0006 -0.0067 0.0033 0.0083
(0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0432) (0.0453)
SAT/ACT Q2 -0.0184 -0.0190 -0.0197 -0.0207 -0.0052 0.0017
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0173)
SAT/ACT Q3 -0.0177 -0.0178 -0.0161 -0.0169 0.0028 0.0023
(0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0181) (0.0185)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0266 0.0206 0.0275 0.0204 0.0394* 0.0411*
(0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0196) (0.0202)
Mother some college -0.0061 -0.0089 -0.0061 -0.0090 -0.0152 -0.0140
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0151)
Mother BA+ -0.0222 -0.0267 -0.0211 -0.0263 -0.0157 -0.0132
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0156)
Dependent -0.0014 -0.0054 0.0001 -0.0041 0.0019 -0.0015
(0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0174)
Parental income -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000
× dependent (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Business -0.0358 -0.0345 -0.0112 -0.0101
(0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0232) (0.0235)
Education -0.0371 -0.0363 -0.0361 -0.0424
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0228) (0.0234)
Engineering -0.0300 -0.0258 -0.0171 -0.0084
(0.0284) (0.0291) (0.0272) (0.0277)
Health 0.0150 0.0100 -0.0216 -0.0266
(0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0272) (0.0279)
Public affairs 0.0062 0.0066 0.0328 0.0233
(0.0399) (0.0404) (0.0367) (0.0374)
Biology -0.0255 -0.0260 -0.0275 -0.0280
(0.0315) (0.0323) (0.0294) (0.0307)
Math science 0.0099 0.0152 0.0413 0.0330
(0.0301) (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0300)
Social science -0.0098 -0.0056 0.0062 0.0078
(0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0249) (0.0256)
History 0.0444 0.0451 0.0486 0.0359
(0.0470) (0.0474) (0.0429) (0.0438)
Humanities 0.0678* 0.0724* 0.0853* 0.0809*
(0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0254) (0.0258)
Psychology 0.0058 0.0038 0.0110 -0.0002
(0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0372) (0.0378)
Private FP -0.0337 -0.0420 -0.0733 -0.0590
(0.0609) (0.0609) (0.0625) (0.0635)
Private NFP 0.0091 0.0064 -0.0140 -0.0006
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0145)
HBCU -0.0864 -0.0758 -0.1270* -0.1170*
(0.0513) (0.0517) (0.0479) (0.0501)
Competitive 0.0163 0.0167 0.0235 0.0106
(0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0253)
Noncompetitive 0.0197 0.0200 0.0193 -0.00482
(0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0278)
1997 earnings -0.0005 -0.0004
($1,000s) (0.0004) (0.0004)
2002 earnings -0.0004* -0.0004*
($1,000s) (0.0002) (0.0002)
UG loan amount 0.0033* 0.0034*
($1,000s) (0.0009) (0.0009)
State controls No No No No No Yes
N 1870 1870 1840 1840 1630 1630
R2 0.0228 0.0355 0.0241 0.0368 0.0655 0.0960
The table shows coefficient estimates (standard errors) based on OLS regressions for the
fraction of student loan debt in nonpayment in 2003. * p < 0.05.
Table 11: Summary of Results from Specification (6) for All Repayment/Nonpayment Outcomes
Share of Fraction Fraction Default × Not Paying ×
UG Debt in Not Share of Debt Share of Debt
Variable Still Owed Default Paying Still Owed Still Owed
Black 0.2160* 0.0554* 0.0853* 0.1080* 0.1580*
(0.0396) (0.0222) (0.0247) (0.0212) (0.0290)
Asian 0.1070 0.0718* 0.0888* 0.0031 0.0083
(0.0615) (0.0326) (0.0377) (0.0330) (0.0453)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0289 0.0061 0.0062 0.0216 0.0411*
(0.0276) (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0147) (0.0202)
Mother some college -0.0467* 0.0225 0.0076 0.0009 -0.0140
(0.0205) (0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0110) (0.0151)
Mother BA+ -0.0616* 0.0029 -0.0068 -0.0185 -0.0132
(0.0213) (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0156)
Business -0.0200 -0.0810* -0.0507 -0.0235 -0.0101
(0.0320) (0.0310) (0.0294) (0.0171) (0.0235)
Engineering -0.0896* -0.0177 -0.0211 -0.0159 -0.0084
(0.0378) (0.0289) (0.0348) (0.0202) (0.0277)
Health -0.0073 -0.0475 -0.0195 -0.0424* -0.0266
(0.0380) (0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0203) (0.0279)
Social science 0.0783* -0.0221 -0.0136 -0.0081 0.0078
(0.0351) (0.0241) (0.0273) (0.0187) (0.0256)
Humanities 0.0826* 0.0008 0.0231 0.0305 0.0809*
(0.0353) (0.0226) (0.0252) (0.0188) (0.0258)
HBCU 0.0409 -0.0049 -0.0399 -0.0604 -0.1170*
(0.0686) (0.0376) (0.0443) (0.0366) (0.0501)
1997 earnings -0.0011* -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004
($1,000s) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
2003 earnings -0.0004 -0.0008* -0.0012* -0.0001 -0.0004*
($1,000s) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
UG loan amount 0.0133* 0.0028* 0.0039* 0.0029* 0.0034*
($1,000s) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009)
The table shows estimated coefficients/average marginal effects from specification (6)
of Tables 6 through 10 if the estimate is statistically significant for any repayment
or nonpayment outcome. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05.
A1: Sample Means (Standard Errors) for Full Sample and Borrowers Only
Characteristic Full Sample Borrowers Only
Male 0.442 0.444
(0.013) (0.010)
Asian 0.025 0.031
(0.004) (0.004)
Black 0.067 0.049
(0.006) (0.004)
Hispanic 0.060 0.043
(0.007) (0.004)
White 0.844 0.873
(0.010) (0.007)
Mother no college 0.442 0.369
(0.013) (0.009)
Mother some college 0.280 0.263
(0.012) (0.009)
Mother BA+ 0.278 0.368
(0.012) (0.009)
Dependent 0.576 0.671
(0.013) (0.009)
Parental income 25.453 41.417
× dependent (0.856) (1.151)
SAT/ACT Q1 0.286 0.272
(0.013) (0.009)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.282 0.290
(0.013) (0.009)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.247 0.259
(0.012) (0.009)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.185 0.179
(0.011) (0.007)
Business 0.240 0.254
(0.014) (0.010)
Education 0.132 0.117
(0.009) (0.006)
Engineering 0.073 0.062
(0.006) (0.004)
Health 0.067 0.060
(0.006) (0.004)
Public affairs 0.038 0.038
(0.005) (0.004)
Biology 0.047 0.037
(0.005) (0.003)
Math science 0.054 0.052
(0.005) (0.004)
Social science 0.082 0.090
(0.006) (0.005)
History 0.018 0.015
(0.004) (0.003)
Humanities 0.079 0.087
(0.006) (0.005)
Psychology 0.033 0.032
(0.004) (0.003)
Private FP 0.022 0.016
(0.005) (0.003)
Private NFP 0.322 0.283
(0.013) (0.009)
HBCU 0.029 0.020
(0.005) (0.003)
Most competitive 0.063 0.074
(0.006) (0.005)
Competitive 0.633 0.649
(0.013) (0.009)
Noncompetitive 0.304 0.278
(0.013) (0.009)
Table A2: Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by Individual
Characteristics (Sample without Graduate School Attendance/Degree Restrictions)
Total UG Share of Fraction Fraction Default × Not Paying ×
Characteristic Earnings Loan Amt. UG Debt in Not Share of Debt Share of Debt
N (in $1,000) (in $1,000) Still Owed Default Paying Still Owed Still Owed
Full sample 3790 51.063 9.287 0.233 0.050 0.092 0.029 0.066
(0.864) (0.133) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Males 1620 64.951 9.426 0.206 0.050 0.091 0.029 0.060
(1.595) (0.216) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Females 2170 39.755 9.176 0.254 0.049 0.092 0.029 0.071
(0.757) (0.165) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Asians 120 62.395 8.856 0.286 0.050 0.071 0.009 0.033
(3.150) (0.604) (0.063) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.017)
Blacks 260 44.910 9.464 0.523 0.098 0.207 0.110 0.243
(1.861) (0.394) (0.045) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044)
Hispanics 230 48.860 7.823 0.198 0.070 0.122 0.017 0.055
(2.400) (0.552) (0.035) (0.022) (0.027) (0.006) (0.016)
Whites 3150 51.032 9.356 0.210 0.045 0.082 0.025 0.055
(0.988) (0.147) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q1 820 42.424 9.565 0.261 0.057 0.107 0.025 0.073
(1.211) (0.354) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
SAT/ACT Q2 900 49.344 9.129 0.229 0.041 0.067 0.015 0.041
(1.447) (0.238) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008)
SAT/ACT Q3 880 56.850 9.132 0.189 0.038 0.082 0.020 0.044
(2.274) (0.251) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
SAT/ACT Q4 830 57.154 9.486 0.230 0.057 0.106 0.051 0.094
(1.739) (0.291) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021)
Mother no college 1490 50.677 8.732 0.243 0.055 0.089 0.023 0.058
(1.254) (0.181) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Mother some college 1090 48.534 9.226 0.202 0.049 0.095 0.046 0.085
(1.339) (0.226) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Mother BA+ 1200 53.796 10.051 0.249 0.043 0.092 0.021 0.060
(1.891) (0.283) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
The table shows sample means (standard errors) based on sample of borrowers without restrictions on graduate
school participation/degrees.
